How Should We View the Russia-Ukraine War?

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?

Depending on how one views the conflict, it is either (a) a genuine move by Russia to defend minorities in the Donbass region of Ukraine, (b) a Russian retaking of territory it has a right to possess through historical occupation, or (c) a continuation of Cold War-era tensions between Russia and the US and its allies. The first and second views are widely criticized by Western media as Russian propaganda. The third view takes on a more realist approach to international relations, though, as will be explained, it can be used to justify inaction and some “moral dessert” arguments that tend to shift the focus away from the humanitarian cost of the conflict.

For the first view, it is pointed out how strange it is for Russia to claim that it wants to “deNazify” a country with a Jew as the head of state. Some activists have warned against believing Western propaganda while at the same time repeating pro-Russia propaganda discussion points.[1]  It’s certainly important to be wary about Western propaganda, but that does not justify embracing Russian propaganda instead. Moreover, even assuming that Russia’s true intent was to deNazify Ukraine, it does not justify the use of force.

          Under the UN Charter, the threat of use of armed force is generally impermissible. An exception is when the use of force is in self-defense. There are two kinds of self-defense: individual or collective.[2] Individual self-defense may be invoked when there is a victim State that was attacked by another entity, and the exercise of self-defense is against the aggressor. Since Ukraine did not attack Russia first, individual self-defense does not apply. On the other hand, there is collective self-defense when a State intervenes in an armed conflict involving an aggressor and a victim. For collective self-defense, there must be a victim that declares itself to be a victim, and the victim must ask for assistance. Also, the State invoking self-defense must first report to the UN the circumstances that justify self-defense.[3] There’s no evidence that there is a victim declaring itself to be such, nor is there evidence that the victim asked for assitance, nor has Russia reported anything to the UN. Even supposing that there is a right to use force (jus ad bellum), it still might not justify how the force is used (jus in bellum). Russia has already threatened to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine[4] as the United States expressed concerns that Russia might begin using weapons that are less precise and are more likely to be unable to distinguish between military and civilian objects.[5]

The second view is based on Putin’s claims that Russia and Ukraine are one people. He asserts that “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood” and is actually a part of Russia instead.[6] It seems that the second view contradicts the first. After all, if Russia’s intent was really to deNazify Ukraine, it would not have had to make claims over Ukraine in its entirety. Even if we harmonize them by saying that Russia wants to deNazify Ukraine and can justify entering its borders by rejecting Ukraine’s statehood, the view is still problematic.

Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have a common history. In the medieval period, they belonged to a "loose federation of city-states." However, contrary to Russia's claim that Ukraine originated from Russia, this federation actually had its capital in what is now known to be Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital. It is actually for that reason that the federation was called the Kievan Rus.[7] It may thus be said that Ukraine is the one that has a greater right to statehood, not Russia.

Moreover, Putin seems to confuse statehood and nationhood. The concept of a nation is different from the concept of a state. A state is a territory with its own institutions, while a nation is a large group of people who inhabit a specific territory and are connected by history, culture, or another commonality.[8] His claim that “Ukraine never had a tradition of statehood” is completely untrue, as Ukraine clearly has a territory and its own populations and institutions.

Even if Putin meant that “Ukraine never had national identity,” the claim also seems to be specious. The Kievan Rus fell apart in the 13th century, when what is now Russia was conquered by the Mongols and the remaining parts of the Kievan Rus were occupied by the Polish-Lithuanian empire.^[9] Even though Ukraine and Russia were initially part of the same federation of city-states, each evolved independently from the other, developing distinct notions of national identity.

Perhaps Putin thinks that Ukraine’s joining of the USSR resets the timer, so to speak, on the development of national identity. However, since Ukraine left, it has reasserted its distinct national identity. We need to look no further than the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, in which the people of Ukraine ousted the elected leader Yanukovych because the latter chose not to pursue a free trade agreement with the EU in favor of building closer ties with Russia.[10]

Even Russia recognizes the status of Ukraine as a nation-state. When the USSR was terminated via treaty in 1991, Ukraine came into possession of nuclear weapons stockpiles belonging to the Union. Ukraine used this as a bargaining tool to get Russia to enter the Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine would give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange from a commitment from Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. Russia, by being a party to the Memorandum, admitted Ukraine’s independence[11] and cannot claim otherwise now.

The third view is that Russia is invading Ukraine because of its growing anxieties about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO. Tensions have been building rapidly between Russia and the West following the annexation of Crimea. As a response to Russia’s actions, NATO sent out reinforcements to countries that would possibly have to face Russian aggression. This includes Ukraine. This has been seen by Russia as an attempt of NATO to expand eastward. Moscow, in response last December of 2021, sent out two security demands in the form of documents: a proposed treaty with the US, as well as an agreement with NATO.[12]

In these documents, Russia has been wanting guarantees that all NATO forces be withdrawn, membership for Ukraine be ruled out, and that NATO cease with its “eastward expansion”. “In effect, he wants recognition that these nations are within Moscow’s sphere of influence," says Geoffrey Van Orden of the Gold Institute for International Strategy.[13]

It is only recently that this Putin has been vocal against the membership of Ukraine. In 1997, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. In 2002, he expressed interest in having the country join NATO. At this time, there was very little opposition from Russia. In essence, the fear is not NATO itself, but the reduced power Putin is to have in the region because of it. With the increase of military presence in the past years, the threat of NATO meddling in his affairs has since increased.[14]

From the perspective of Putin, the fear is not unfounded. To him, NATO has promised time and time again to refrain from eastward expansion, and has time and time again broken its promises. For this reason, many are arguing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an inevitable consequence of American imperialism. One of these people is Walden Bello, who tweeted February 24, 2022 that:

“The Russian invasion of the Ukraine is not justified, but it is the predictable result of Washington’s efforts to bring NATO right to the borders of Russia following the collapse of the old Soviet Union and install a government friendly to the West in Kyiv.”[15]

Although Bello clarified that the invasion was not justified, framing it as predictable or inevitable could be problematic. This is because a big reason why NATO inched closer to Russian borders is at the request and courting of Ukraine, as mentioned previously. Thus, framing the invasion as an inevitable consequence of NATO expansion allows us to blame Ukraine for the situation it is currently in. If Ukraine did not court the West, Russia would not have acted this way— the invasion is Ukraine’s “just desserts.” This notion shifts the focus away from the considerable humanitarian cost of the conflict and towards the “who’s to blame?” question, which is hardly a productive discussion to have right now.

ISSUES WITH THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY

Ukraine may be used by Russia as a message to make NATO retreat.  However, the action taken by Russia in response is not strategic for five reasons.

First, Ukraine, far from being convinced that it should stop aligning with the West, is being pushed further towards the West in search of allies. As of March 3, 2022, at least 16,000 foreign troops are headed to Ukraine to assist the government fend off Russian attacks. President Zelensky has said that they are receiving more ammunition and assistance from Western allies. ^[16]

Second, even if NATO has broken its promises in the past with regard to eastward expansion, these acts of agression retroactively legitimize the expansion. International conflicts are about the clash of competing narratives between international actors. Narratives are important because that is how states create and maintain alliances. Whatever moral highground Russia had when NATO broke its promises, it lost when it broke the Budapest Memorandum and when it violated the UN Charter. Adding to this is the fact that Russia used its veto power in the UNSC to block a resolution condemning Russia for its actions.

(As an aside, the UN system needs to seriously rethink its commitment to the P5 system in the UNSC. Many threats to world peace are caused directly or indirectly by the US, China, or Russia. It is utterly ridiculous that the cause of a conflict can unilaterally prevent the UN from acting to stop said conflict.)

Third, Ukraine now has more of an ability to demand not only assistance from NATO, but also the EU. Zelensky asked the EU to make Ukraine a member state. Many EU states have previously issued statements in support of Ukraine, giving Ukraine the opportunity to issue the request for EU membership as something of a challenge: if you're serious about siding with us, prove it. The request was warmly received by Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission.[17] Although it is argued that the application won’t be processed on time considering that admittance into the EU requires the unanimous consent of the member states,[18] the situation still favors Ukraine. This is because (a) the conflict creates pressure on EU states to expedite the process (b) all EU states have an interest in stabilizing the situation in Ukraine because the conflict is already triggering a refugee crisis in the region, where these refugees will undoubtedly seek asylum in EU states,[19] and (c) even if it takes a while, the message of solidarity against Russian aggression has already been sent.

Fourth, the invasion prompted the imposition of many economic sanctions on Russia. Sanctions are imposed by a country on another. Western countries have frozen assets belonging to Russia's central bank, cutting off at least $630 Billion from Russia's useable funds. The US, EU, and UK have banned businesses from dealing with Russia.[20] Russia cannot sustain the war it is prosecuting.

To be fair, there is an argument to be made that economic sanctions do more harm than good. The argument goes that since the humongous economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 didn't stop them from annexing Crimea, similar sanctions would also not do much good in 2022. However, Russian citizens will be hurt by the sanctions. Thus, the argument goes that economic sanctions on Russia will target innocent Russian civilians, not the people in power. Economic sanctions only work if the government cares about what its citizens think.[21]

I respectfully disagree. The sanctions today are different from those done in 2014. Many of these sanctions are being imposed on powerful individuals in Russia. There is a hit list of powerful businessmen and women close to the Kremlin. There are additional sanctions on Putin and Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov personally.[22]  Moreover, a difference between 2014 and 2022 is that in 2014, Russia was successful in framing the annexation of Crimea as support for the Russian-speaking minority in Crimea. As a result, Putin didn’t face internal opposition.[23] As mentioned earlier in this paper, Putin is still using the same “we’re just helping out minorities in Ukraine” justification. However, Putin is now facing a lot of internal opposition. Thousands of citizens are protesting the invasion of Ukraine, with members of the cultural and sporting elite asking their government to stop the attacks.[24]

Fifth, Putin’s “anti-NATO expansion” justification is self-defeating. Putin doesn’t want NATO to get closer to Russia. But if it occupies Ukraine, Russia is paradoxically bringing itself closer to NATO. Occupying more territory often means that there are more ways for the enemy to enter. Which, in turn, causes more anxiety for the occupying power. That anxiety allows the occupying power to justify more expansion. And more. And more.

CONCLUSION

       This war presents many difficult questions. Are war crimes being committed? What do we do about refugees? Do we need to reform the UN? Is this the fault of the West? Are Putin’s fears about NATO expansion warranted? (Maybe I will write about those another time)

        There are no easy answers. It’s hard to write about conflicts in a “fair” way because the writer will always doubt whether the information they have is accurate or if it is just propaganda from an interested party.

        That being said, I think there are a few lessons that we must keep in mind. One is that even if we might reject certain narratives underpinning a conflict, we need to understand that many people do buy into these narratives. These narratives are rarely wholly fabricated from thin air. Rather, they are built from real experiences and possibly reinforced by propaganda. Therefore, in order to understand how conflicts emerge, we must understand (a) what narratives are being believed, (b) why are they being believed, and (c) who is believing them.

        Another thing is that the international law system is decidedly non-Positivist (or at least, not in the traditional sense of the word ‘positivism’). The UN Charter, cases decided by the ICJ and other international tribunals, and even treaties— they are not enforced by any central authority. The international system is largely anarchic in nature. Thus, trying to get any state to do anything takes a bit more creativity than just “you agreed to X, so we expect you to abide by it.” Actors to a conflict will always need to think about more than the most immediate parties. They need to think about their reputations as well.

What is the purpose of international law, then, if it cannot solve conflicts on its own? International law is all about consent. If a treaty is made, it is because state parties consented to its entry into force. If a practice becomes custom, it is because states consented to doing something with the opinion that it is an obligation. General principles of law are principles derived from domestic laws (in foro domestico) and are thus impliedly consented to by states by virtue of them having those laws in the first place. Because of this process, the creation of international law also entails the formulation of collective views of what is morally right and wrong. In conflicts, they serve as guides to answer “who is in the right?” and to encourage certain behavior with the promise of being closer to the international community. They are a necessary, though insufficient, condition for the maintenance of international peace.

 

 //I wrote this for class. I didn't have a lot of time so it still has a lot of my cluttered stream-of-consciousness bull. Oh well!

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[1] For an example, see Gabriela Bautista’s Twitter thread: @gbautistaaa

“- Tumutulong ang Russia para biguin ang mga atake ng Ukranian gov't laban sa mamamayan ng Donbass - Inaatake ng Russia ngayon ang mga key military facilities ng Ukraine gov't bilang pagtatanggol sa Donbass” Feb 24, 2022

[2] Art 51 UN Charter

[3] Nicaragua vs US

[4] Wolf, Zachary. Russia's nuclear threats: What you need to know. CNN. March 1, 2022. Accessible at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/28/politics/russia-nuclear-threats-putin-what-matters/index.html

[5] AFP, ‘Staggering’ death toll, banned bombs raise fears Russia targeting civilians. Times of Israel. March 3, 2022. Accessible at:  https://www.timesofisrael.com/staggering-death-toll-banned-bombs-raise-fears-russia-targeting-civilians 

[6] Vorobyov, Niko. Putin says Russia, Ukraine share historical ‘unity’. Is he right? Al Jazeera. Feb 25, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/history-of-ties-between-ukraine-and-russia

[7] Id.

[8] https://www.thoughtco.com/country-state-and-nation-1433559

[9] Id.

[10] Interfax,Ukraine. Parliament passes statement on Ukraine’s aspirations for European integration. Kyiv Post. Feb 22, 2013. https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/parliament-passes-statement-on-ukraines-aspirations-for-european-integration-320792.html

[11] Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances. December 5, 1994. Accessible at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140317182201/http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484

[12] Sandford, Alasdair. Ukraine crisis: What is Russia's problem with NATO? Euronews. February 10, 2022. Accessible at:  https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/02/10/what-is-russia-s-problem-with-nato-and-how-should-the-west-respond

[13] Id.

[14] Popova, Maria and Shevel, Oxana. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Is Essentially Not About NATO. Just Security. February 24, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.justsecurity.org/80343/russias-new-assault-on-ukraine-is-not-entirely-maybe-not-even-largely-about-nato/

[15] https://twitter.com/WaldenBello/status/1496712995832938500

[16] Oshin, Olafimihan. Zelensky says first foreign fighters now in Ukraine. The Hill. March 3, 2022. Accessible at: https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/596718-zelensky-says-first-foreign-fighters-now-in-ukraine

[17] Bilefsky, Dan. Why Ukraine’s road to European Union membership will likely be long and winding. New York Times. March 1, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-european-union-membership.html

[18] Id.

[19] International Centre for Migration Policy Development. Europe's Ukrainian refugee crisis: What we know so far. ICMPD. February 28, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.icmpd.org/news/europe-s-ukrainian-refugee-crisis-what-we-know-so-far

[20] British Broadcasting Corporation. Ukraine: What sanctions are being imposed on Russia? BBC. March 4, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659

[21] Afesorgbor, Slyvanus, and van Bergeijk, Peter AG. Economic sanctions will hurt Russions long before they stop Putin's war in Ukraine. The Conversation. March 1, 2022. Accessible at: https://theconversation.com/economic-sanctions-will-hurt-russians-long-before-they-stop-putins-war-in-ukraine-178009

[22] Supra Note 19.

[23] Supra Note 20.

[24] Sauser, Pjotr, and Roth, Andrew. Thousands join anti-war protests in Russia after Ukraine invasion. The Guardian. Feb 24, 2022. Accessible at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/we-dont-want-this-russians-react-to-the-ukraine-invasion